Environment, irreversibility and optimal effluent standards by Jou, Jyh-Bang
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
 
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 
, 48:1, pp. 127–158
 









The present article investigates the use of performance standards to correct envi-
ronmental externalities. Each ﬁrm in an industry emits waste in the production
process, and, in turn, the average waste emissions of the industry adversely affect
the ﬁrm’s productivity. The ﬁrm, which incurs sunk costs when employing capital
to abate waste emissions, is uncertain about the efﬁciency of capital. The ﬁrm will
underestimate environmental externalities and will therefore pollute more than is
socially efﬁcient. To correct this tendency, the regulator can set a limit on either
emissions or the emission-output ratio at the socially efﬁcient level. The ﬁrm will
invest more, produce more, and pollute less when the regulator implements the




Manufacturing ﬁrms usually emit waste in the production process. The
regulator can induce these ﬁrms to employ more abatement capital by imple-
menting command-and-control or market-based instruments. The investment




For example, massive sunk costs are needed to switch from coal burning to





and Carr 1999). Unlike earlier articles on optimal environmental protection
policies (see e.g., Mohtadi 1996), the present article will account for these
sunk costs. 
The present article compares the use of absolute performance standards
(deﬁned as emission limits) with the use of proportional performance
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Costly reversibility may arise because of asset speciﬁcity, the lemons problem, or govern-
ment regulation (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
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present article builds a model in which an industry composed of a ﬁxed
number of ﬁrms faces a demand function with a constant price elasticity.
Each ﬁrm’s output depends positively on the amount of labour it employs,
but negatively on industry’s average waste emissions. The ﬁrm can employ
capital to abate waste emissions, and both the ﬁrm and the regulator share
the same information about uncertainty regarding the ﬁrm’s abatement
technology. The ﬁrm will underestimate environmental externalities
because it will ignore the adverse effect of its emissions on other ﬁrms’ pro-
ductivity. Therefore, it will pollute more than is socially efﬁcient. To correct
this tendency, the regulator can either set an absolute or a proportional
performance standard at the socially efﬁcient level. The responses of a ﬁrm
to these two policies, however, are divergent. The ﬁrm will invest more, pro-
duce more, and pollute less when the regulator implements the former than
when the regulator implements the latter.
The present article is related to the published literature that applies the
theory of non-cooperative dynamic games to environmental management
such as Haurie and Krawzyck (1997), Haurie and Zaccour (1995), Krawzyck
(1995), and Krawzyck and Zaccour (1999). Like these articles, the present
article models efﬂuent management as a hierarchical game with a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium at the lower level and a Stackelberg equilibrium at the
upper level. That is, at the lower level of the game, ﬁrms compete for pro-
duction and investment in a Cournot-Nash type environment. At the upper
level of the game, the regulator (i.e., the leader), who anticipates the
behavior of a ﬁrm (i.e., the follower), sets an efﬁcient level of performance
standard accordingly. However, these articles abstract from the investment
decision of a ﬁrm, and resort to simulation analysis because they construct
a more comprehensive model than that constructed in the present article.
Previous studies on performance standards either focus on different issues
or adopt assumptions that differ from those made in the present article.
For example, a large volume of empirical articles (see e.g., Barbera and
McConnell 1986; Gray and Shadbegian 1995) ﬁnd that performance stand-
ards impact on productivity at the ﬁrm or plant level, but they ignore the
fact that abatement capital may enhance productivity through reducing
emissions (as emphasised by the present article). A number of other articles




Several studies on real options either allow government intervention while ignoring
externalities (see e.g., Dixit 1991; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Hassett and Metcalf 1992) or
focus on pecuniary rather than production externalities (see e.g., Dixit and Rob 1994; Fatas
and Metrick 1997). 
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policy instruments such as efﬂuent taxes and subsidies, performance stand-
ards, and marketable permits (see e.g., Mohtadi 1996; Montero 2002;
Requate and Unold 2003; Roberts and Spence 1976; Weitzman 1974).
In contrast, the present article abstracts from the issue of asymmetric
information.
The present article is also closely related to studies that apply real




Jou assumes that a ﬁrm’s emissions are independent of its output level, and
investigates the use of efﬂuent fees to correct environmental externalities.
By contrast, the present article assumes that a ﬁrm’s emissions increase as
the ﬁrm produces more, and emphasises that the uses of absolute and pro-
portional performance standards may have different impacts on the ﬁrm’s
investment, production, and polluting behavior.
The remaining sections are organised as follows. Section 2 constructs the
model and calculates the short-run equilibrium private and social proﬁts.
Section 3 allows abatement investment to be either costlessly reversible or
completely irreversible. The absolute and proportional performance stand-
ards required to support social efﬁciency for both types of investments are
derived. The impacts of several exogenous factors such as uncertainty,
costly expandability, and competitive pressure on these two instruments are
investigated both analytically and numerically. The last section concludes




The present article builds a model that incorporates the main features
appearing in both the standard real options (see e.g., Dixit 1991) and the
environmental economics published literature (see e.g., Cropper and Oates
1992). In the present article, the whole economy is represented by an indus-




 identical risk-neutral ﬁrms facing a demand function












See also Pindyck (2000, 2002), Saphores and Carr (1999), and Xepapadeas (1999). The
former three articles consider a regulator who intends to reduce stocks of environmental
pollutants once-and-for-all. In Pindyck’s two articles, the regulator controls a ﬂow variable
that is related to these stocks. In contrast, in Saphores and Carr, the regulator directly con-
trols these stocks. These three articles show that the interaction of irreversibility and uncer-
tainty will affect the regulator’s choice of optimal timing to implement policy. While these
articles allow the regulator to implement policy just once, the present article allows the reg-
ulator to adopt performance standards that may vary over time. The study by Xepapadeas
(1999) allows uncertainty in demand, emission tax, and abatement technology, but it does



















































 in the industry produces























































































), which is industry’s average waste emissions, will be strictly pos-



































a ﬁrm that emits hazardous pollutants will adversely affect health conditions
of the ﬁrm’s and the other ﬁrms’ employees. Consequently, the productivity
of all ﬁrms in the industry will decline. Pollution may also adversely affect
the welfare of consumers (see e.g., Cropper and Oates 1992). The present
article, however, abstracts from this negative effect. Equation (2) also depicts
a case of a uniformly distributed and diffused pollutant, and thus abstracts
from both spatial distribution of ﬁrms (see e.g., Haurie and Krawzyck 1997)
and stock externalities (see e.g., Farzin 1996). Equation (2) is restricted, yet
it leads to analytically tractable solutions, and thus simpliﬁes analysis.




 does not directly employ any productive capital,
















































), in the form given by
(3)
Equation (3) indicates that abatement capital exhibits diminishing returns
because an increase in abatement capital reduces emissions at a declining
rate. The speciﬁcation in equation (3) also indicates that the amount of




























In reality, waste emissions from all industries will have a negative impact on a ﬁrm’s
output in one industry (Ballard and Medema 1993), yet the present article assumes that the




Some articles on environmental economics allow a ﬁrm to employ both productive and
abatement capital (see e.g., Kort 1996). The empirical study by Gray and Shadbegian (1998)
indicates that these two types of capital tend to crowd out each other. Several articles in
published the real options literature also allow two types of capital investment (see e.g.,
Dixit 1997). However, productive capital is ignored here because including it complicates the
analysis while adding little insight into the issue on which the present article focuses.
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The reason is obvious, for example, if steel or electricity production in-
creases, pollution also increases. This speciﬁcation is more generalised
than that in the published literature. For example, Jou (2001) assumes that








 0), and Krawzyck
(1995) and Xepapadeas (1999) assume that a ﬁrm’s emissions are propor-










 1). The present article, by contrast, allows











 1), or a decreasing rate (i.e., γ1 < 1).
In equation (3), the factor Z(t) exhibits a negative correlation with xi(t),
indicating that abatement capital is more efﬁcient in good states of the world
(i.e., when Z(t) is higher). The factor Z(t), which is required to be positive
so as to ensure that ﬁrm i’s waste emissions given by equation (3) are positive,
is assumed to evolve as geometric Brownian motion with no drifts:
dZ(t) = σZ(t)dΩ(t), (4)
where σ (>0) is the instantaneous volatility of the growth rate of Z(t), and
dΩ(t) is an increment to a standard Wiener process, with E{dΩ(t)} = 0 and
E{dΩ(t)}
2
 = dt. By the standard theory of Brownian motion, we know that
Z(t) has a lognormal distribution with mean Z(0) and variance  .
6
Equation (4) indicates that information about the evolution of a ﬁrm’s
waste emissions arriving in time is independent of its investment decision.
This contrasts with that of Kolstad (1996) where uncertainty can be
resolved over time through learning. Equation (4) also indicates a case of
symmetric information between a ﬁrm and the regulator regarding the efﬁ-
ciency of abatement capital because both regard Z(t) as exogenously given.
7
The case of asymmetric information is considered in the standard published
environmental economics literature – see Jung et al. (1996), Requate and Unold
(2003), and Weitzman (1974). These articles, however, focus on ranking various
policy instruments including efﬂuent taxes and subsidies, performance stand-
ards, and marketable permits. The published real options literature that
incorporates this issue includes Gaudet et al. (1998), which, however, does not
allow environmental externalities.
6 Equation (3) indicates that I do not allow new abatement capital to be more efﬁcient
than old capital. One alternative way to take this into consideration is to replace ki(t) by
a(t)ki(t), where da(t)/dt ≥ 0, indicating that there is technological progress.
7 The present article allows a ﬁrm to adopt only one type of abatement capital. One may
assume that a ﬁrm chooses between an old and a new abatement technique, and then follows
the solution method in Dixit (1991) to solve the ﬁrm’s choice. The qualitative results of the
present article, however, will not be affected even though such a choice is allowed.
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Suppose that q(t) = (q1(t), ... , qN(t)) and k(t) = (k1(t), ... , kN(t)). The oper-
ating proﬁt ﬂow of ﬁrm i, denoted by  , is equal to its
operating revenue P(t)qi(t), minus its variable cost denoted by 
Z(t)) in equation (6) below, thus yielding
(5) 




Following the published literature applying non-cooperative dynamic
games to environmental management (see e.g., Haurie and Krawzyck 1997;
Haurie and Zaccour 1995; Krawzyck 1995; Krawzyck and Zaccour 1999),
the present article models efﬂuent management as a hierarchical game with
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the lower level where ﬁrms compete for
production and investment. At the upper level of the game, the regulator
acts as the leader and a ﬁrm acts as the follower. The regulator should
anticipate the production and investment behavior of the ﬁrm, and then set
performance standards at the socially efﬁcient level accordingly.
In Cournot-Nash short-run equilibrium, ﬁrm i will take all the other ﬁrms’
production strategies as given, while choosing an output level, denoted
by  , to maximise its operating proﬁt,   given by equation (5). Con-
sequently,   is derived by setting the derivative of   with respect to
qi(t) equal to zero. This yields the equality of marginal revenue with short-
run marginal cost as given by
(7)
Imposing the short-run equilibrium condition qj(t) =   ( j = 1, ... , N) in
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where h = 1/ε and  . Evaluating   in equation (5) at qj(t) =
 (j = 1, ... , N) yields the optimised value of ﬁrm i’s operating proﬁt,
denoted by π
1(k(t), Z(t)), as given by 
(10)
In contrast, a social planner will internalise environmental externalities
before producing ﬁnal goods. The social planner perceives that ﬁrm i’s
emissions, xi(t), are equal to the industry’s average emissions, xa(t), because
all ﬁrms are identical. By equation (3), this also implies that the central
planner will impose qj(t) = qi(t) and kj(t) = ki(t) (j = 1, ... , N) before pro-
ducing ﬁnal goods. The operating proﬁt of ﬁrm i perceived by the social
planner, denoted by  , is equal to operating revenue
P(t)qi(t) minus the variable cost of ﬁrm i perceived by the social planner,
denoted by   in equation (11) below, thus yielding
(11)
By equation (2) and the condition xa(t) = xi(t), the variable cost of ﬁrm i
perceived by the social planner, wli(t), is given by
(12)
The social planner will choose an output level, denoted by  , to max-
imise ﬁrm i’s operating proﬁt,   given by equation (11). Consequently,
 is derived by setting the derivative   with respect to qi(t) equal to
zero. This yields the equality given by 
(13)
where ε is required to be larger than one (and thus h = 1/ε < 1) so as to
ensure that marginal revenue is positive. Imposing the condition qj(t) = 
Gk t j j
N
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Evaluating   in equation (11) at qi(t) =   yields the optimised value
of  , denoted by π
2(ki(t), Z(t)), as given by
(16)
where 
3. Efﬁcient performance standards
When industry pollution exhibits negative externalities as shown by equa-
tion (2), then market outcomes will be inefﬁcient. The policy to correct this
includes market-based instruments or command-and-control regulations.
Market-based instruments, however, are still not popular: the application
of tradable permits appeared in few countries such as Australia, Canada,
Chile, and the USA (see e.g., Gomboso et al. 1999), and efﬂuent fees (and
subsidies) adopted by Europe have been set at very low levels, and thus are
usually not considered as an effective way to control pollution (Kolstad, 2000).
Command-and-control regulations, which are still the dominant form of
environmental regulation in the world today, have two major types: technology-
and performance-based standards (Stavins 2000). Technology-based standards
specify the method and/or the equipment (the so-called best available control
technology) that ﬁrms must use to comply with a particular regulation. In
the USA, the speciﬁc technologies are usually determined by states on a
case-by-case basis. However, the USA has established national emission
standards for new sources of pollutants, called the New Source Performance
Standards (Tietenberg 1992, p. 397). In the present article I focus on performance
standards, which could specify an absolute quantity of permissible emissions,
but more typically these standards establish allowable emissions in proportional
to output (Keohane et al. 1998). In what follows, I will investigate both types
of performance standards, while abstracting from the auditing and admin-
istrative costs associated with implementing them.
For ease of exposition, I will abstract from capital depreciation and also
assume that the purchasing and installation price of abatement capital, denoted
by PK(t), grows at a constant rate µ; that is,
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2()














Pt N qt i
h 22 ()    (( ) ) . =
−
π i







00 (( ) ,  ( ) )    () () , ktZ t B kt Z t ii
aa =





















λγEnvironment, irreversibility, and optimal efﬂuent standards 135
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
dPK(t) = µPK(t)dt. (17)
A ﬁrm is in an environment where it is costly to expand capacity later when
µ is positive.
8 The following analysis, however, is suitable for both positive
as well as non-positive values of µ. Two types of investments are considered:
(i) investment is costlessly reversible where the resale price of abatement
capital is equal to the purchase price of capital;
9 and (ii) investment is
completely irreversible where the resale price of abatement capital is equal
to zero.
3.1 Costlessly reversible investment
Suppose that investment is costlessly reversible. Then ki(t) will be a choice
rather than a state variable. Let ρ denote a given (risk-adjusted) discount
rate. The abatement capital stock chosen by ﬁrm i at each instant will be
found by equating the private marginal return to capital with the user cost
of capital (i.e., the rental cost of abatement capital net of capital gain)
(Jorgenson 1963); that is,
(18)
where π
1(k(t), Z(t)) is given by equation (16). In Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
all ﬁrms will choose an equal amount of abatement capital, denoted by  ,
where the subscript ‘u’ denotes the situation where no regulation is imposed.
Substituting this condition into equation (18) and then rearranging yields
(19)
8 This may arise because of limited land, natural resource reserves, or the need for a permit
that is in short supply (Dixit and Pindyck, 1998).
9 One may allow the installed abatement capital to have some resale value. Under such a
situation, in addition to efﬂuent standard restrictions, the regulator may add one more policy
instrument such as a tax on disinvestment. Such an extension, however, will not alter the
main results of the present article. See, for example, the article by Jou and Lee (2001) where
R&D capital exhibits positive production externalities and partial irreversibilities, and the
regulator gives investment tax credits when R&D capital is purchased, but imposes taxation
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where .
10  Here and in what follows, I will
assume that ρ > µ so as to ensure that demand for abatement capital is
decreasing with the price of capital; that is,   given by equation (19) is
decreasing with PK(t). Substituting   into equation
(8) yields the choice of output for ﬁrm i without any regulation, denoted by
:
(20)
where  . Substituting   and
 into equation (3) yields the choice of emission for ﬁrm i without
any regulation, denoted by  :
(21)
Similarly, the capital stock chosen by a social planner at each instant,
denoted by kf 2(t), is found by equating the social marginal return to capital
with the user cost of capital; that is,
(22)
where π
2(·) is given by equation (16). Evaluating equation (22) at ki(t) = kf 2(t),
and then rearranging yields 
(23)
Substituting ki(t) = kf 2(t) into equation (14) yields the social planner’s choice
of output, denoted by qf 2(t):
10 One may rigorously show that all Cournot-Nash equilibria considered here and in what
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(24)
where .  Substituting  qi(t) = qf 2(t) and ki(t)
= kf 2(t) into equation (3) yields the choice of emission by the social planner,
denoted by xf 2(t):
(25)
3.2 Irreversible investment
In the long-run, through Cournot-Nash competition, ﬁrm i will maximise
the expected discounted private proﬁt ﬂow net of the investment costs. Sup-
pose that V1(k(t), Z(t), PK(t)) denotes the value function for ﬁrm i, which
is given by
(26)
where the state equation for ki(τ) is given by
(27)
Ii(τ) is also the gross investment rate for ﬁrm i at time τ, π
1(·) is given by
equation (10), ρ is the discount rate, and Et{·} denotes the conditional expec-
tation taken at time t. The maximisation problem faced by ﬁrm i includes
N + 2 state variables: Z(t), PK(t), and an n-tuple of strategies, k(t). Firm i will
treat Z(t), PK(t) and k−i(t) = (k1(t), ... , ki−1(t), ki+1(t), ... , kN(t)) as exogenously
given, while controlling Ii(t). However, all elements of k−i(t) should be equal
to ki(t) in Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
As is well known in the published real options literature, the interaction
of the stochastic evolution of Z(t) and investment irreversibility indicates
that ﬁrm i solves a problem of instantaneous control of Brownian motion.
The optimal policy is to regulate the state variable ki(t) at a lower barrier,
denoted by the desired capital stock ki*(t) (Bertola and Caballero 1994). If
the currently installed capital ki(t) is smaller than ki*(t), ﬁrm i should invest
so as to obtain ki(t) = ki*(t); otherwise no action should be taken. Firm i
should form expectations about the distant future regarding when and how
much to invest because irreversible investment decisions will affect future
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cash ﬂows: ﬁrm i may be stuck with an excessive stock of capital in the initial
period as pointed out by Clark et al. (1979), and Bertola and Caballero (1994).
Given the abatement technology shown by equation (3), it is equivalent to
saying that ﬁrm i should regulate its pollution, xi(t) in equation (3), at an upper
barrier, denoted by  . Consequently,   is also the maximum amount
of waste emissions tolerable by ﬁrm i. 
Deﬁne .
When ki(t) > ki*(t), the private marginal gain from increasing the abatement
capital stock, v1(·) = ∂V1(·)/∂ki(t), is given by (see Appendix)
(28)
where
F1 is a constant to be determined, β is the larger root of τ in the quadratic
equation given by equation (56), and φ(1) is obtained by setting τ = 1 in
equation (57). On the right-hand side of equation (28), the ﬁrst term is
the private value of the option to install an additional unit of capital, while
the second term is the private value of the last incremental unit of installed
capital. Two optimal conditions must be satisﬁed at ki(t) = ki*(t) (Pindyck
1988). First, the private marginal gain from increasing the capital stock
must equal its marginal costs at the instant of investing (see equation (53)
in Appendix); that is,
v1(·) = PK(t). (29)
This is the value-matching condition. Second, the equality given by equation
(29) must be satisﬁed at the states both just before and just after the investment,
thus yielding
(30)
This is the smooth-pasting condition.
The  ki(t) desired by ﬁrm i  when investment is completely irreversible
without any regulation, denoted by  , is solved from the procedures
as follows. First, evaluate both equation (29) and equation (30) at ki(t) =
.  Second, multiply equation (30) by Z(t)/(a0β),  and then add the
xt i *() xt i *()
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result into equation (29). Third, use the value of φ(1) given by equation (57).
Finally, impose the equilibrium condition  . The
result is
(31)
where −α is the smaller root of τ in the quadratic equation given by equation
(56), and   is given by equation (19). Substituting   into
equation (8) yields the maximum level of output produced by ﬁrm i, denoted
by :
(32)
Substituting both   and ki(t) =   into equation (3) yields the
maximum amount of waste emissions tolerable by ﬁrm i, denoted by  :
(33)
Similarly, suppose that V2(ki(t), Z(t), Pk(t)) denotes the value function
for ﬁrm i perceived by the social planner, which is given by
(34)
where π
2(·) is given by equation (16). The maximisation problem faced by the
social planner includes three state variables: Z(t), PK(t), and ki(t). The social
planner will treat Z(t) and PK(t) as exogenously given, while controlling Ii(t).
Suppose that ki*(t) and   respectively denote the desired capital stock
and the maximum amount of waste emissions tolerable by the social planner.
When k(t) > ki*(t), the social marginal gain from increasing the abatement
capital v2(·) = ∂V2(·)/∂ki(t), is given by (see Appendix)
(35)
where F2 is a constant to be determined. Suppose that ki*(t) chosen by the
social planner is denoted by ks2(t). The value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions applied to v2(·) are respectively given by
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v2(·) = PK(t), (36)
(37)
Evaluating both conditions (36) and (37) at ki(t) = ks2(t), and jointly solving
these two equations yields
ks2(t) = m1kf 2(t). (38) 
Substituting ki(t) = ks2(t) into equation (14) yields the maximum output
level produced by the social planner, denoted by qs2(t):
(39)
Substituting both qi(t) = qs2(t) and ki(t) = ks2(t) into equation (3) yields the




The information in this section is summarised in the form of Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: No matter whether capital investment is costlessly reversible or
not, a ﬁrm will invest at less, produce at less, and pollute at more than the
socially efﬁcient levels (Proof: see Appendix).
An individual ﬁrm will underestimate the adverse effect of pollution on
production. Therefore, it will pollute more than is socially efﬁcient as indi-
cated by Proposition 1. Equivalently, the ﬁrm will invest less in abatement
capital than is socially efﬁcient. The ﬁrm will also produce less than is
socially efﬁcient because as indicated by equation (20), investment is posi-
tively correlated with the output level.
As the leader, the regulator will anticipate and thus correct the result
stated in Proposition 1 by using either an absolute or a proportional per-
formance standard. While the regulator can set an absolute performance
standard at the socially efﬁcient level, he cannot be sure whether the ﬁrm
will respond by producing at the socially efﬁcient level. By contrast, if the
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equal to the ratio of the socially efﬁcient emission level over the socially
efﬁcient output level. This is precisely the efﬁcient proportional perform-
ance standard considered in what follows.
I will discuss both cases where absolute and proportional performance
standards are imposed at their respective socially efﬁcient levels. Suppose
that capital investment is costlessly reversible, and the regulator imposes on
each ﬁrm an absolute performance standard equal to xf 2(t) in equation
(25). Replacing   in equation (21) by xf 2(t) yields the corresponding
stock of capital, denoted by  :
(41)
where .  Replacing 
in equation (20) by   yields the corresponding output level, denoted by
:
(42)
Consider the case where capital investment is completely irreversible, and
the regulator imposes on each ﬁrm an absolute performance standard equal
to xs2(t) in equation (40). Replacing   in equation (33) by xs2(t) yields
the corresponding stock of capital, denoted by  :
(43)
Replacing   in equation (41) by   yields the corresponding output
level, denoted by  :
(44)
Given the emission function equation (3), a ﬁrm that underestimates the
externality from pollution will underestimate both the beneﬁcial effect of
abatement capital in reducing pollution, and the adverse effect of production
in raising pollution. This yields the result stated in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: No matter whether capital investment is costlessly reversible or
not, if the regulator restricts pollution at the socially efﬁcient level, then a
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Let us switch to the case where the regulator imposes on each ﬁrm a propor-
tional performance standard, which is deﬁned as the permissible emission per
unit output (Montero 2002; Verdier 1995). Deﬁne  , and
yf 2(t) = xf 2(t)/qf 2(t). Suppose that capital investment is costlessly reversible,
and that the regulator imposes on each ﬁrm a proportional performance
standard equal to yf 2(t). Equating yf 2(t) and   yields the choice of capital
stock with regulation, denoted by  , as given by
(45)
Replacing   in equation (20) and equation (21) by   yields the




Deﬁne ,  and  ys2(t) = xs2(t)/qs2(t). Suppose that capital
investment is irreversible and that the regulator imposes on each ﬁrm a pro-
portional performance standard equal to ys2(t). Equating ys2(t) and 
yields the desired capital stock with regulation, denoted by  :
(48)
Replacing   in equation (32) and equation (33) by   yields the




Pooling all above information yields the results stated in Propositions 3 and 4:
Proposition 3: Suppose that the regulator imposes on a ﬁrm a proportional
performance standard at the socially efﬁcient level. No matter whether investment
is costlessly reversible or not, the ﬁrm will over-produce and over-pollute. The ﬁrm
will also over-invest (under-invest) if emission is increasing with output at an
increasing (a decreasing) rate (Proof: see Appendix).
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Proposition 4: No matter whether investment is costlessly reversible or not, a
ﬁrm will invest more, produce more, and pollute less if the regulator implements
an efﬁcient absolute performance standard as compared to the case where the
regulator implements an efﬁcient proportional performance standard (Proof: see
Appendix).
The reason behind Proposition 4 follows from Proposition 2. Proposition
2 indicates that a regulator who imposes on a ﬁrm an absolute performance
standard at the socially efﬁcient level will induce the ﬁrm to produce at
more than the socially efﬁcient level. The emission-output ratio will thus
be lower than is socially efﬁcient. This indicates that abatement capital is
employed (and thus output is produced) at a level which is beyond the level
that keeps the emission-output ratio at the socially efﬁcient level. If,
instead, the regulator sets a proportional performance standard at the
socially efﬁcient level, then the ﬁrm will invest and produce less, and thus
pollute more as compared to the case where the regulator sets an efﬁcient
absolute performance standard.
Proposition 4, however, does not rank absolute and proportional per-
formance standards. As indicated by Proposition 2, given environmental
externalities a ﬁrm will not produce and pollute at the socially efﬁcient
level. These two inefﬁciencies should be corrected by implementing two
instruments together, for example, efﬂuent taxes and performance stand-
ards. The use of either an absolute performance standard or a proportional
performance standard will induce the ﬁrm to over-pollute as well as over-
produce, as indicated by Propositions 2 and 3, respectively.
Finally, I will investigate how various factors such as uncertainty (σ),
costly expandability (µ), and competitive pressure (N) affect the regulated
performance standards. Some important results are stated in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5: (a) Suppose that investment is costlessly reversible and it is
more costly to purchase capital in the future (µ is increased). The regulator
should then implement a more stringent absolute performance standard, which
induces a ﬁrm to invest and produce more. The regulator should then also
implement a more stringent proportional performance standard, which induces a
ﬁrm to invest and produce more, and to pollute less. (b) Suppose that investment
is irreversible and uncertainty becomes greater (σ is increased). The regulator
should then implement a less stringent absolute performance standard, which
induces a ﬁrm to invest and produce less. The regulator should then also imple-
ment a less stringent proportional performance standard, which induces a ﬁrm to
invest and produce less, and to pollute more. (c) Suppose that competition be-
comes more intense (N is increased) whether investment is costlessly reversible
or not. The regulator should then implement a more stringent absolute performance144 J.-B. Jou
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standard provided that γ1 > γ2, which induces a ﬁrm to have ambiguous attitudes
toward investment and output decisions. The regulator should then also implement
a more stringent proportional performance standard provided that γ1 > 1 + γ2,
which induces a ﬁrm to have ambiguous attitudes toward investment, output, and
polluting decisions (Proof: see Appendix).
The reason behind Proposition 5(a) is as follows. Suppose that it is more
costly to purchase capital at a later date. As indicated by equation (70),
when investment in abatement capital is costlessly reversible, a social planner
will then employ more capital and therefore pollute less. Consequently, the
regulator should set more stringent absolute and proportional performance
standards. However, as investment becomes irreversible, an offsetting effect
will arise (see equation (75)) and, therefore, it becomes ambiguous whether
the regulator should implement a more stringent policy.
The results of Proposition 5(a) entail policy implications. Suppose that
capital investment is almost costlessly reversible. Proposition 5(a) then indi-
cates that the regulator should set a much more stringent standard (at least
in terms of the adjustment period) when the expected cost of meeting a stand-
ard rises. Consequently, older and newer ﬁrms should be treated differently
with newer ﬁrms getting preferential treatment. However, in practice, older
ﬁrms rather than newer ﬁrms receive preferential treatment. Such a policy,
which may be justiﬁed if investment is irreversible, usually worsens pollution by
encouraging ﬁrms to keep old, dirtier plants in operation (Keohane et al. 1998).
The reason behind Proposition 5(b) is as follows. As indicated by equa-
tion (79), when investment is irreversible, a social planner will employ less
capital and thus pollute more as uncertainty becomes greater. Accordingly,
the regulator should be less stringent in implementing absolute and propor-
tional performance standard policies, as indicated by equation (74) and
equation (95), respectively. The ﬁrm will then be induced to invest and to
produce less, as indicated by equation (81) and equation (88) for the former
policy, and by equation (100) and equation (105) for the latter policy.
The policy implication of Proposition 5(b) is as follows. The so-called
high-tech industries usually invest in an environment that is more volatile
than the traditional industries. As a result, the regulator should favour high-
tech industries when designing performance standard policies.
The reason behind Proposition 5(c) is as follows. Consider the situation
that competition becomes more severe. If the adverse effect of production
in raising pollution outweighs the beneﬁcial effect of abatement capital in
reducing pollution; that is, γ1 > γ2, then a social planner will pollute less (see
equation (71) and equation (76) no matter whether investment is irreversible or
not. Therefore, the regulator should set a more stringent absolute perform-
ance standard. The regulator could also set a more stringent proportionalEnvironment, irreversibility, and optimal efﬂuent standards 145
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performance standard if the adverse effect is sufﬁciently larger than the bene-
ﬁcial effect; that is, γ1 > 1 + γ2, as indicated by equation (92).
The result of Proposition 5(c) indicates that whether the regulator should
implement a performance standard policy that favours certain industries
depends on the efﬁciency of abatement capital employed by ﬁrms in this
industry. For example, suppose that ﬁrms in two industries employ the
same kind of abatement capital and suppose that γ1 > γ2 (γ1 > 1 + γ2), then
the regulator should implement a more stringent absolute (proportional)
performance standard policy for the industry that is more competitive.
11
3.4 Numerical examples
In this section I make the theoretical results more meaningful through
numerical examples. The benchmark parameter values are chosen as follows:
Z(t) = 1, λ = 0.1, σ = 20 per cent per year, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 0.5, ε = 3, N = 500, µ = 0
per year, w = 0.5, ρ = 5 per cent per year, and Pk(t) = 1.
12 For ease of exposi-
tion, I only present the results for the case where abatement investment is
completely irreversible. Given these benchmark parameter values, I ﬁnd
that the absolute performance standard that is socially efﬁcient is given by
xs2(t) = 0.1309, and the desired capital stock, and the output level induced
by it are respectively given by   = 0.0503, and   = 0.0294. The
proportional performance standard that is socially efﬁcient is given by
ys2(t) = 19.968, and the maximum level of pollution, the desired capital stock,
and the maximum level of output induced by it are respectively given by
 = 0.4149,   = 0.0025, and   = 0.0208. These results conﬁrm
the results of Proposition 4 indicating that an absolute performance standard
policy will induce a ﬁrm to invest and produce more, and pollute less as
compared to a proportional performance standard policy. I also investigate
the responses in these seven endogenous variables to a change of σ around
the region (0, 40 per cent), µ around the region (−1 per cent, 1 per cent),
and N around the region (400, 600), holding the other parameters at their
benchmark values. These responses are respectively shown in ﬁgures 1–3.
13
11 It is interesting to investigate whether the regulator should favor new abatement capital
that is more efﬁcient (higher γ2). However, our comparative-statics results regarding this issue
yield ambiguous results (not shown in the Appendix). 
12 As suggested by Dixit (1989), some capital costs arise from depreciation and are more
thought of as recurrent, and some costs are recoverable when disinvestment occurs.
Accordingly, a ratio of w:ρPK = 10:1 seems plausible.
13 For ease of exposition, I scale down ys2(t) by a factor of 100, and scale up all 
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All results shown in ﬁgures 1–3 conform to those stated in Proposition 5.
Figure 1 indicates that as capital investment is more costly to expand later,
the regulator should be more stringent in both absolute and proportional
performance standard policies toward irreversible investments. In response,
a ﬁrm will invest and produce more. Figure 2 shows that as uncertainty
becomes greater, the regulator should be more lenient in both policies
toward irreversible investments, a ﬁnding that is in line with Jou (2001) that
Figure 1 The impact of a change in µ.
Figure 2 The impact of a change in σ.Environment, irreversibility, and optimal efﬂuent standards 147
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investigates the optimal efﬂuent fee policy. In response, a ﬁrm will be less
willing both to invest and produce. Finally, ﬁgure 3 indicates that as competi-
tion becomes more intense, the regulator should impose a more stringent
absolute performance standard policy because γ1 > γ2 (see Proposition 5(c)),
but should implement a less stringent proportional performance standard
policy because the constraint γ1 > 1 + γ2 stated in Proposition 5(c) is not satis-
ﬁed. In response, a ﬁrm will invest and produce less.
4. Conclusion
The present article investigates the use of performance standards to correct
environmental externalities. Each ﬁrm in an industry emits waste in the
production process, and, in turn, the average waste emissions of an industry
adversely affect the ﬁrm’s productivity. The ﬁrm, which incurs sunk costs
when employing capital to abate waste emissions, is uncertain about the
efﬁciency of capital. The ﬁrm will underestimate environmental externalities,
and therefore, it will pollute more than is socially efﬁcient. To correct this
tendency, the regulator can set a limit on either emissions or the emission-
output ratio at the socially efﬁcient level. The ﬁrm will invest more, produce
more, and pollute less when the regulator implements the former limit than
when the regulator implements the latter limit.
The present article has abstracted from several features that may be
allowed in future research. First, it ignores both the adverse effect of pollu-
tion on the welfare of consumers and spatial distribution of ﬁrms. Second,
it ignores the costs associated with implementing performance standards. It
Figure 3 The impact of a change in N.148 J.-B. Jou
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is worth investigating whether the conclusion of the present article will be
affected when taking these two features into account.
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Appendix
Derivation of v1(·) and v2(·)
Consider the problem of choosing Ii(t) such that equation (26) is maximised.
The Bellman-Hamiton-Jacobi for this problem can be written as
(51)
Equation (51) says that the total return on this asset, ρV1(·) has two com-
ponents, the cash ﬂow π
1(k(t), Z(t)) − PK(t)Ii(t), and the expected rate of
capital gain,  , where
(52)
by using both equations (4) and (11), and by applying Itô’s Lemma. Differenti-
ating the right-hand side of equation (51) with respect to Ii(t), and then setting
the result equal to zero yields
(53)
Substituting   given by equation (17) and   in equation (52) into
equation (51), and using the condition in equation (53) yields the differential
equation
(54)
Let ∂V1(·)/∂ki(t) = v1(·). Differentiating equation (54) term by term with
respect to ki(t) yields
ρπ Vk t Z t P t I t
dt
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(55)
where G is deﬁned in equation (28). Based on Bertola and Caballero (1994),
the term   solves the homogeneous part of equation (55).
Substituting this into equation (55) yields the quadratic equation
(56)
Denote β and −α respectively as the larger and smaller roots in the quadratic
equation given by equation (56). Following Dixit (1991), equation (56) can
be rewritten as
(57)
where φ(τ) > 0 if –α < τ < β. Figure 4 depicts φ(τ) as a function of τ.
One particular solution from the non-homogeneous part of equation (55)
is given by
(58)
Since the value function V1(·) must approach zero as Z(t)  approaches
zero, only the positive root in equation (56) should be considered. The gen-
eral solution of equation (55), which is composed of solutions from both
the homogeneous and non-homogeneous parts, is shown by equation (28).
Similarly, the Bellman-Hamiton-Jacobi equation for the problem described
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Figure 4 φ(τ) versus τ.
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where
(60)
Differentiating the right-hand side of equation (59) with respect to Ii(t),
and then setting the result equal to zero yields
(61)
Substituting π
2(·) given by equation (16) and   in equation (60) into
equation (59), and using the condition given by equation (61) yields
(62)
Let ∂V2(·)/∂ki(t) = v2(·). Differentiating equation (62) term by term with re-
spect to ki(t) yields
(63)
The solution to v2(·) in equation (63) is thus given by equation (35).
Proof of proposition 1
Dividing   in equation (19) by kf 2(t) in equation (23) yields
(64)
since if N = 1 then  , and differentiating   with respect
to N yields a negative sign.
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Dividing   in equation (31) by ks2(t) in equation (38) yields 
(66)
Dividing   in equation (33) by xs2(t) in equation (40) yields 
(67)
Dividing   in equation (20) by qf 2(t) in equation (24) yields 
(68)
since if N = 1 then  , and (for N ≥ 2) differentiating 
qf 2(t) with respect to N yields a negative sign.
Dividing   in equation (32) by qs2(t) in equation (39) yields 
(69)
This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 2
Proposition 2 follows because mk > 1 and mq > 1 such that 
.
Proof of proposition 3
Because   it follows that 
and   If  γ1 < (>)1 then   and  thus 
and  . This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 4
Because mk > 1 it follows that   Because mq > 1,
it follows that   and  .
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Proof of proposition 5
Differentiating xf 2(t) with respect to µ and N yields
(70)
(71)
Let X = (1 + α)/α > 1 and  , then m3 = X
Y.
Differentiating m3 with respect to σ and µ yields
(72)
since   from ﬁgure 4;
(73)
where 
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(78)
where   and 
> 0.
Differentiating m1 with respect to σ and µ yields
(79)
(80)
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Let ,  then  m2 = X
−Z. Differentiating m2 with
respect to σ and µ yields
(86)
(87)




Differentiating yf 2(t) with respect to µ and N yields
(91)
(92)
Deﬁne ,  then  ys2(t) = mys2(t). Differentiating m4 with
respect to σ and µ yields
(93)
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(94)




Differentiating   with respect to µ and N yields
(98)
(99)
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(104)




Differentiating   with respect to µ and N yields
(108)
(109)
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